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Introduction
In October 1910, former president Theodore Roosevelt was in
St. Louis campaigning for the Republican governor of Missouri,
Herbert Hadley. Upon learning of an “International Aeronautic
Tournament” outside the city, the energetic and always inquisitive
Roosevelt demanded to see it. “TR” and Hadley arrived at Kinloch Field on 10 October by an eighty-automobile motorcade—
the largest such procession St. Louis had then seen—just as one
of the Wright brothers’ six aircraft landed near the grandstand.
The pilot of the fragile machine was Arch Hoxsey, a pince-nezwearing aviator who earlier that year had made America’s first
recorded night flight, and who had recently set an endurance record of 104 miles by flying non-stop to St. Louis from Springfield,
Illinois. Hoxsey jumped out of the Model B biplane and walked
to Roosevelt’s car through an array of Missouri National Guard
troops surrounding the vehicle.
“I was hoping, Colonel, that I might have you for a passenger
on one of my trips,” Hoxsey said to Roosevelt.1
“By George, I believe I will,” Roosevelt replied. He accompanied Hoxsey to the Model B and, to the surprise of those who had
arrived with him at the air show, sat down in the passenger seat
and said, “Let her go!”
After a four-minute spectacle above Kinloch Field that included
a series of climbs and dives—punctuated by “oohs” and “ahhs”
from the crowd below—Roosevelt became the nation’s first president to fly in an airplane. During the flight he pointed to a Signal Corps building close by and had Hoxsey pretend to attack
it. “War, army, aeroplane, bomb!” Roosevelt shouted as Hoxsey
1
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flew back and forth above the installation. Onlookers mobbed TR
once he landed, despite the best efforts of the Missouri guardsmen to keep them away. When the crowd finally parted enough
to give him a chance to speak, he triumphantly exclaimed, “By
George, it was fine!”2
Roosevelt’s flight befitted the sense of American adventurism
that he embodied, and it also befitted his role as a leader of the
progressive movement in the United States. Indeed, as a standardbearer of the progressives, Roosevelt was on the lookout for ways
to improve the daily lives of American citizens, and the airplane
offered to do just that. The “flying machine” portended revolutions in transportation and communications; commerce and trade
would benefit enormously from its continued development. Yet as
Roosevelt’s comment to Hoxsey above Kinloch Field indicated,
the airplane also offered tremendous potential as an instrument of
war. A generation of American airmen would view the airplane’s
military promise in progressive terms—as the key to winning conflicts quickly, cheaply, and efficiently.
For most Americans, though, progressivism had nothing to
do with war. The movement, which spanned the nation during
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, affected many
different groups and encompassed several disparate threads. All
focused on progress and reform, and included efforts to reduce
inefficiency and waste in manufacturing and business practices,
eliminate corruption from government and business, increase the
responsiveness of government institutions, promote fairness and
equality for all social classes, improve working conditions and
protect workers, and enhance the public’s general well-being. At
its heart, progressivism promised change that was just, rational,
positive, and efficient. Roosevelt emerged as a progressive leader
of the Republican Party famous for his “trust busting” and would
2
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later break away from the Republicans to form his own “Progressive Party” in 1912. Democrat Woodrow Wilson, the winner
of the 1912 election, also considered himself a progressive, and
worked hard to assure the success of the “individual entrepreneur” against the perceived evils of “big business.” The progressive movement’s span across political party lines demonstrated its
wide national appeal.
The devastation and ugly realism of World War I ended the
progressive era for most Americans; the repudiation of the Versailles Treaty and Wilson’s League of Nations exemplified the public’s postwar rejection of the movement’s ideals. Yet for Army Air
Service officers like Edgar Gorrell and William “Billy” Mitchell,
the carnage and waste that they witnessed on the Western Front
sparked the beginning of a progressive effort that was unique—an
attempt to reform war by relying on its own destructive technology as the instrument of change. They were convinced that the airplane—used as a bombing platform—offered the means to make
wars much less lethal than conflicts waged by armies or navies.
The airmen contended that a clash of armies, with its subsequent slaughter, was unnecessary to fight and win future conflicts.
Instead, the truly vital ingredients of modern war—the essential industries that produced weapons and fuel, key communications centers, and lines of transportation—were vulnerable to attack from the air. The loss of those installations would not only
wreck a nation’s ability to fight, it would also sap the will of the
populace, because the same facilities needed to wage modern war
were also those necessary to sustain normal, day-to-day life. Aircraft would destroy the vital centers through precision bombing—
sophisticated technology would guarantee that bombs hit only
the intended targets, and few lives would be lost in the process.
The finite destruction would end wars quickly, without crippling
3
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manpower losses—maximum results with a minimum of death—
and thus, bombing would actually serve as a beneficial instrument of war.
To assure the success of their ideas, the advocates of “progressive air power” also called for reforming America’s defense structure, with the establishment of a separate air force as a new armed
service. They set out to convince the nation of that perceived need,
and along the way recruited a core of like-minded officers who
took their ideas and further refined them. The conviction that the
“strategic bombing” of vital centers offered the solution to fighting and winning future wars efficiently blended with the belief
that service autonomy was essential to assure the bomber’s proper
wartime use against industrial targets—not against armies or navies. Ultimately, the two notions became inseparable—the ability
of air forces to fight and win wars independently of armies and
navies justified an autonomous air force—and an autonomous
air force was necessary to assure that air power could efficiently
achieve victory on its own.
By the eve of Pearl Harbor, Mitchell disciples like Henry H.
“Hap” Arnold and Frank Andrews, and a legion of officers inculcated with Mitchell’s notions refined by the Air Corps Tactical School, combined to produce a substantial coterie of airmen
who subscribed to a belief in “progressive air power.” Most would
not have used such a term to describe their convictions; Mitchell
himself used the term rarely. Yet they were just as committed to
reforming war as the muckrakers had been to reforming industrial working conditions.
Collectively, the airmen subscribed to the following central
tenet: air power was a more efficient military instrument than
land or sea power because it offered a way to fight and win wars
more quickly and less expensively (in terms of lives lost on both
sides) than did armies or navies. The plan devised by former Tac4
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tical School instructors in August 1941 for using American air
power in the ongoing European war called for strategic bombing to wreck Germany’s war-making ability to such a degree that
an invasion of the continent might prove unnecessary. Arnold,
by then Commanding General of the Army Air Forces, approved
the plan, as did Army Chief of Staff George Marshall and Secretary of War Henry Stimson. The promise of progressive air power
had broad appeal.
The reality of war—which revealed that American bombers and
their crews were rarely capable of pinpoint destruction during combat conditions, and included an overarching political objective of
“unconditional surrender” that allowed unlimited devastation—
generated a momentum of its own that undermined several of the
progressive notions that had guided American airmen before the
conflict. By 1945, “progressive air power” meant quickly ending
the war to reduce American casualties. Still, many air commanders continued to believe that the destruction of vital centers—
despite the accompanying death and desolation—not only hastened the war’s end, but also ultimately saved lives on both sides.
As a result, the progressive mindset that guided airmen on the eve
of war never really disappeared during its conduct.
The progressive notions of beneficial bombing—germinated
in World War I and tested in World War II—became the basis of
doctrine for an independent Air Force in the immediate postwar
era, and continue to guide Air Force thought today.

5
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1 • Genesis in the Great War
Accurate bombing on a large scale is a new science and requires the entire time and study of
the man who is to shoulder the responsibility for success or failure during the coming year.
• Lt. Col. Edgar S. Gorrell, 2 January 1918

29 May 1910

On a warm Sunday morning, U.S. Military Academy cadets assembled at Trophy Point to witness a spectacular event. Aviation pioneer Glenn Curtiss had announced that he would pilot
his thirty-foot-long biplane from Albany to New York and claim
the New York World’s prize of ten thousand dollars for making
the first flight between the two cities. The initial leg of his journey
had gone well: Curtiss had taken off shortly after 7:00 a.m., had
stopped for fuel at Camelot, and had taken off again at 9:30. Yet
as he approached Storm King Mountain a few minutes later at an
altitude of one thousand feet, violent air currents above the Hudson River plummeted his frail craft to within fifty feet of the water. He struggled with the flight controls to prevent a further loss
of altitude and, as he did so, flew past West Point. His dive hid
the airplane from the cadets’ view and caused them to run to Cullum Hall, perched high on a bluff overlooking the Hudson. From
there they could clearly see the tiny craft, the first flying machine
that most of them had ever witnessed. Oblivious to the pilot’s difficulty, the cadets tossed their caps into the air and shouted their
favorite football cheer, with a slight modification: “Rah, rah, ray!
Rah, rah, ray! West Point, West Point, Armay! Curtiss! Curtiss!
Curtiss!”1
7
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One of those chanting was Edgar Staley Gorrell, a diminutive
nineteen-year-old “yearling” from Baltimore. Gorrell’s small stature and boyish features had earned him the nickname “Nap” from
his classmates, and Nap was mightily impressed by the spectacle.
From the day he viewed Curtiss’s flight—which arrived in New
York City after two hours and forty-six minutes of air travel—Gorrell determined that he too would become an aviator. Assigned to
the infantry after graduation, he transferred to the Signal Corps’
Aviation Section in 1914 and then completed flight training. Two
years later, as one of eleven pilots in the First Aero Squadron, he
helped track Pancho Villa’s band of outlaws across northern Mexico. He became the first American to fly an aircraft equipped to
take automatic photographs, the first to fly an aircraft while conducting radio experiments, the first American Army officer to volunteer for a parachute jump, and one of the first officers to fly at
night. He also developed the first plan for an American bomber
offensive against an enemy nation.2
Early Notions of American Air Power

Gorrell’s scheme for attacking Wilhelmine Germany called into
question the basic purpose of an air force: whether to support the
Army directly through air operations tied to the Army’s immediate progress on the front lines or to conduct “independent” operations, such as “strategical” bombing, that would ultimately improve the Army’s situation at the front but that also offered the
prospect of a rapid, cheap victory by destroying the enemy’s warmaking capability and will to fight. If air power could achieve
victory independently of ground forces, it implied that the Army’s “air” branch might deserve a measure of autonomy. Before
World War I, however, such concerns were minimal, even among
airmen. When Congressman James Hay proposed a bill in February 1913 to create an “Air Corps” equivalent in stature to the
8
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infantry, cavalry, or artillery, aviators were almost unanimous in
condemning the proposal. Lieutenants Benjamin D. Foulois and
Henry H. “Hap” Arnold testified that the Signal Corps’ control
of aviation was satisfactory.3 Captain William “Billy” Mitchell,
at that time a non-flyer and the lone Signal Corps representative
on the Army’s General Staff, argued that aviation was essential to
Signal Corps reconnaissance and communication. “The offensive
value of this thing has yet to be proved,” he stated.4
The outbreak of war in Europe heightened interest in the airplane’s military potential. That conflict, combined with a growing rift between Signal Corps aviators and their non-flying superiors, spurred Secretary of War Newton D. Baker to launch
a General Staff investigation in April 1916 on the appropriateness of severing aviation from Signal Corps control. Many pilots
bemoaned the “under 30, bachelor only” restrictions on flying,
while many of their non-flying superiors regarded the young aviators as undisciplined. Baker decided that air autonomy was not
the answer, but also admitted that combat in Europe had demonstrated that the air arm was more than just an auxiliary service.5
The next year, on the eve of America’s entry into the Great War,
a joint Army-Navy panel recommended purchasing “a rigid airship of the zeppelin type” that could bomb an enemy’s homeland.6
Although the dominant focus of America’s air power vision remained on supporting the Army, that view did not exclude independent operations.
The failure of American civilian and military leaders to articulate a definitive concept of military aviation likely stemmed from
the paucity of military aviation available. When Congress declared war against Germany on 6 April 1917, the Signal Corps’
Aviation Section numbered only 65 officers on active duty, of
whom 26 were certified pilots, backed by 1,100 enlisted men and
200 civilian personnel. The Army’s sole example of applying air
9
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power against an enemy was the use of eight Curtiss jn3 training aircraft in Brigadier General John J. Pershing’s expedition to
Mexico, and all had broken down. That fiasco caused Congress
to lavish appropriations of almost thirteen million dollars on the
Aviation Section, but by the end of 1916 the Army possessed only
149 aircraft—mostly trainers and virtually all obsolete—while
another 302 were on order but undelivered. Only twelve companies were capable of building airplanes for the government, and
they produced just 90 aircraft in 1916. In contrast, twenty-seven
British firms built 5,716 airplanes that year. The chairman of the
National Advisory Committee of Aeronautics, the civilian preparedness agency that initially coordinated Army wartime aviation policy with American industry, warned: “Though millions
may be available for a specific purpose in time of great need, no
amount of money will buy time.”7
Yet time would not be forthcoming. On 23 May 1917, French
Premier Alexandre Ribot, responding to pleas from his generals
for American material as well as men, cabled his ambassador in
Washington dc and requested 4,500 airplanes for the 1918 campaign, along with 2,000 replacements per month. Given the state
of Army aviation, Ribot’s request bordered on the fantastic—
multiplied out for just the first half of the year, it totaled 16,500
aircraft! Moreover, the cable failed to mention what types of aircraft the United States should produce. With Foulois, now a major, serving as Signal Corps representative, the Joint Army-Navy
Technical Board hurriedly sketched out a program for a 9,000aircraft force with a reserve of 3,000 airplanes. Of those totals, the
board slated 1,000 and 333 respectively as bombers; the remainder
would be fighters and observation aircraft. The program’s magnitude disheartened many members of the Army’s General Staff, who
believed that the emphasis on aviation might limit the nation’s capability to manufacture other needs for the service.8 Their reser10
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vations led Brigadier General George O. Squier, the Army’s chief
signal officer, to present the board’s proposal directly to Secretary
of War Baker. Baker then took it to Congress, which appropriated
a staggering $640 million to fund the entire program. President
Woodrow Wilson signed the measure into law on 24 July.
Even before Congress approved the plan, an American mission
departed for Europe to obtain information on the best aircraft designs to produce in the United States. Arriving in Liverpool on the
twenty-sixth, the mission spent the next five weeks interviewing
air officers and industrialists in Britain, France, and Italy. Led by
Major Raynal C. Bolling, a former U.S. Steel lawyer who had organized the National Guard’s first aviation unit, the group consisted of 105 military and civilian aviation experts. One of them
was Captain Nap Gorrell, fresh out of mit and sporting a master
of science degree in aeronautical engineering.
Despite the group’s qualifications, Bolling faced a difficult task.
Besides the time constraint demanding an immediate start to fullscale American production, the mission suffered from two key
problems. First, it would not finish its work before the arrival of
General John J. Pershing’s American Expeditionary Force (aef)
staff, which would evaluate air requirements from the vantage
point of the force that would do the fighting. Bolling’s mission
reported to General Squier in Washington dc, not Pershing, and
the mission’s conclusions would not match those of Pershing’s officers. Second, the group’s departure for Europe almost a month
before Congress approved the air arm’s structure compelled its
members to devise a structure of their own, and doing so required
making determinations about air strategy that would dictate aircraft roles and the types needed to fulfill them.9 Many of their decisions stemmed from the ideas of Allied airmen. For Nap Gorrell, the insights gained would endure, and would form the basis
of his plan for a bomber offensive.
11
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Bolling’s group spent its first week in Britain meeting with British Director-General of Military Aeronautics and General Officer
Commanding the Royal Flying Corps, Sir David Henderson. He
suggested that the Americans concentrate exclusively on bomber
production and not try to develop a balanced force of fighters,
bombers, and observation aircraft.10 The first attack on London
by German Gotha bombers a fortnight before the Bolling mission arrived may have triggered Henderson’s recommendation.
In two minutes, fourteen Gothas had dropped nearly two tons
of bombs, killing 162 people and injuring 432.11 The bombers
attacked in daylight and with impunity; none fell to antiaircraft
fire or fighters. Many of London’s East End workers, fearing the
bombers’ return, stayed away from their factories. Meanwhile,
British Prime Minister David Lloyd George and his War Cabinet
ordered two squadrons of fighters home from France. Britain’s
leaders also looked to pay the Germans back in kind. Before the
Gotha assault, the British had shunned the development of an
independent bombing force. In April 1917, their air strength in
France consisted of twenty-seven fighter squadrons, twenty-one
army support squadrons, and two bomber squadrons. After the
Gotha raid, the British government’s Air Board recommended developing forty squadrons of long-range bombers.12
In France and Italy, Bolling’s group also discovered a strong
preference for bomber development. The French could not produce enough aircraft to satisfy both the demand for additional
air support at the front and the desire for bombers to attack Germany. They hoped that the 4,500 figure mentioned by Premier
Ribot could form a strategic force—that intent had been mistakenly omitted from the cable—and they made certain that Bolling’s
mission understood their wishes.13 In Italy, the Americans found
bombing operations that were more than mere speculation. The
Italians had begun a long-range air campaign against targets in
12
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Austria and were, at the time, the only Allied nation conducting
“strategic” bombing. Their air offensive, sporting as many as 140
aircraft on a single raid, impressed Bolling’s group.14 The group
was also impressed by the man who had molded the Italian bomber
force, the designer and theorist Gianni Caproni. Gorrell in particular was inspired by Caproni’s vision of air power, which paralleled the thoughts of Giulio Douhet, Caproni’s close friend and
confidant.15 Caproni maintained that for bombing to be effective
it had to be “systematic, thorough, and consistent.”16 This assertion became a cornerstone of Gorrell’s plan.
Submitting his initial report to General Squier on 15 August
1917, Bolling called for the production of training aircraft, aircraft to support American troops in the field, and “aircraft in excess of the tactical requirements of the Army in France.” 17 His
group had selected four types of Allied aircraft for American production: the British Dehaviland dh-4 for day-bombing and observation; the British Bristol and French spad for air-to-air combat,
and the Italian Caproni Tri-motor for long-range night bombing. He recommended that the United States build as many of all
types as possible. Bolling contended that the number of airplanes
needed to support the ground forces depended on the size of the
Army and would vary in proportion to it. Combat aircraft in excess of those required for Army support could conduct “independent” air operations, such as night raids on Germany. He further
suggested a precise apportionment of aircraft types for this independent force: 37.5 percent of its aircraft should be fighters capable of escorting bombers, 25 percent should be day bombers,
and the remainder should be Caproni night bombers.18 He found
the prospects of night bombing especially appealing, and noted
that if it were conducted “on a sufficiently great scale and kept
up continuously for a sufficient time, there seems good reason
to believe that it might determine the whole outcome of military
13
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operations.”19 Yet Bolling’s “third-place mention of the strategic
force was apparently taken to mean that it was third in order of
relative importance,”20 and bombers did not appear in the initial
American aircraft manufacturing program.
One individual had no intention of allowing the notion of an
American air offensive to wither away—Billy Mitchell. Since opposing an autonomous air service four years earlier, Mitchell had
come to believe that air power might hold the secret to winning
wars. After finishing his General Staff assignment in June 1916,
he became General Squier’s deputy in the Signal Corps’ Aviation
Section and was promoted to major. He then took advantage of
a provision in the 1916 National Defense Act lifting the ban on
flight training for servicemen over thirty (Mitchell was thirty-six).
From September 1916 to January 1917, he paid a dollar a minute for 1,470 minutes of off-duty flying instruction at the Curtiss
Aviation School in Newport News, Virginia.21 His flying “expertise” likely caused the War Department to send him to Europe as
an aeronautical observer, and he arrived in Paris four days after
America’s declaration of war.22 Two weeks later he spent ten days
at the front lines observing French General Robert Nivelle’s disastrous offensive and visiting French aviation units. He recalled his
thoughts after first viewing trench warfare from the air:
A very significant thing to me was that we could cross the lines of
these contending armies in a few minutes in our airplane, whereas
the armies had been locked in the struggle, immovable, powerless to
advance, for three years. To even stick one’s head over the top of a
trench invited death. This whole area over which the Germans and
French battled was not more than sixty miles across. It was as though
they kept knocking their heads against a stone wall, until their brains
were dashed out. They got nowhere, as far as ending the war was
concerned.23
14
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In May, Mitchell visited the headquarters of Major General
Hugh Trenchard, commander in the field of Britain’s Royal Flying Corps (rfc). Mitchell arrived abruptly, wearing an extravagant uniform that he designed himself, but his unbridled exuberance persuaded the general who was “decided in manner and very
direct in speech” to give him a three-day dose of rfc operations
and Trenchard philosophy. Mitchell was particularly impressed
by Trenchard’s commitment to a single, unified air command that
would allow him to “hurl a mass of aviation at any one locality
needing attack.” For the British air leader, a tightly controlled, continuous aerial offensive was the key to success, and assigning air
units to individual ground commanders for defense was a mistake.
Trenchard highlighted the rfc’s General Headquarters Brigade,
a force designed to destroy the German army’s means of supply
and reinforcement, but which possessed too few aircraft to do so
in the spring of 1917. He argued that air power should attack as
far as possible into the enemy’s country, and noted that the development of new airplanes with greater ranges would make Berlin
a viable target. He did not, however, contend during his first encounter with Mitchell that the quickest way to defeat the German
army was through an air offensive aimed at the German nation.
While others around Trenchard stressed a “radical air strategy”
against the German homeland, he remained focused on using air
power to defeat the German army on the Western Front. Nonetheless, Mitchell emerged from his initial contact with Trenchard
profoundly affected by the general’s ideas and convinced that an
aerial offensive was a key to winning the war.24
As a result of observing Allied operations, Mitchell proposed
dividing the American air contingent into categories of “tactical” and “strategical” aviation. He made his proposal to Pershing’s chief of staff, who arrived in France with the commanding
general in mid-June. Tactical aviation would consist of squadrons
15
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attached to divisions, corps, or armies and would operate as any
other combat arm. In contrast, strategical aviation “would be bombardment and pursuit formations and would have an independent
mission very much as independent cavalry used to have. . . . They
would be used to carry the war well into the enemy’s country.”25
This mission, he insisted, could have “a greater influence on the
ultimate decision of the war than any other arm.”26 Soon after receiving Mitchell’s plan, Pershing selected a board of officers to determine the proper composition for aef aviation. Because Mitchell was the senior American aviator in Europe, the general made
him chief of the newly created Air Service, which had replaced the
Signal Corps as the Army’s air organization in the aef.27 Mitchell’s appointment did not, however, guarantee his proposal’s acceptance. On 11 July, Pershing outlined a comprehensive plan for
aef organization that authorized fifty-nine squadrons of tactical
aircraft for service with the field armies. It made no mention of
an independent force for “strategical” operations.
A Plan Evolves

Pershing’s failure to approve the proposal caused Mitchell to redouble his efforts. In August 1917 he asked the aef Intelligence
branch to provide information on strategic targets in Germany,
and later received a list of industrial targets in the Ruhr from
the French.28 He also created a staff to explore the possibilities
of bombing Germany in more detail. To direct the Air Service’s
Technical Section, Mitchell picked the twenty-six-year-old Gorrell, who had just completed his work with the Bolling mission.
Gorrell’s job for Mitchell would be similar to his former work
for Bolling: to determine Air Service requirements, including the
various types of aircraft needed. In trying to estimate the correct
number of bombers, Gorrell considered the prospects of strategic
bombing, and ultimately produced America’s first plan for a stra16
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tegic air campaign. He developed this plan in relative splendor, for
Mitchell chose the Chateau de Chamarandes, a magnificent hunting lodge built by Louis XV, as his headquarters. Located within
a mile of Pershing’s headquarters at Chaumont, the chateau provided both living quarters and office space. It continued to serve
as Air Service headquarters after Mitchell left in October to become Air Service Commander in the Zone of the Advance.29
Besides Mitchell, a variety of individuals helped Gorrell develop
his plan. Gorrell stayed in contact with Bolling, who remarked
in early September that the importance of “bombing operations
with direct military ends in view” could not be overestimated.30
In addition, veteran pilots Harold Fowler and Millard F. Harmon,
both Air Service majors, assisted Gorrell.31 Fowler flew with the
Royal Flying Corps before America’s entry in the war, while Harmon was an Air Service pilot in the Philippines before the conflict.
Gorrell also received a large measure of support from three individuals uniquely qualified to help develop an air campaign plan:
Wing Commander Spencer Grey of the Royal Naval Air Service
(rnas), Gianni Caproni, and Major Hardinge Goulborn Tiverton, a British Lord and, like Grey, a pilot with the rnas. Grey
was a liaison officer attached to Air Service headquarters and
had participated in raids against German inland targets from the
rnas base at Dunkirk, plus he had helped develop a 1,650-pound
bomb. Gorrell considered him the “world’s greatest authority on
questions dealing with aerial bombardment” and relied heavily
on his expertise.32
Caproni, whose bomber was slated for American production,
met frequently with Gorrell in the autumn of 1917. Besides providing Gorrell with a list of Germany’s major industrial targets,33
Caproni also sent him an English-text copy of a new book, Let
Us Kill The War; Let Us Aim at the Heart of the Enemy, by the
Italian journalist Nino Salveneschi. The book was a compilation
17
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of Caproni’s major thoughts on how air warfare could achieve an
independent victory, and Gorrell embraced its message enthusiastically. “I have read with great interest your book entitled ‘Let us
Kill the War; Let us Aim at the Heart of the Enemy,’ which you
so kindly gave me,” he wrote Caproni on 31 October. “May I
ask you to let me have half a dozen copies of this book and I will
guarantee to spread the gospel in all directions.”34
Salveneschi’s book—an unabashed endorsement for Caproni’s
Tri-motor bomber—contained a number of perceptions that reappeared in Gorrell’s plan. The Italian argued that victory in the current conflict meant destroying the enemy’s army rather than occupying his country, and that the key to destroying his army was to
take away its means to fight. The Allies could thus obtain victory
in one of two ways: by exceeding the enemy’s armament production, or by wrecking the factories that built the weapons.35 Outproducing Germany’s enormous industrial capacity would be difficult, Salveneschi asserted. Air power, however, offered the means
to destroy the factories, which were the “heart” of the enemy war
effort. Stabbing the heart would in turn kill the war.36
Salveneschi warned that the Germans would build up their
own bomber force for an offensive against Allied production
centers unless the Allies first attacked German industry. He listed
the major German factories as those in Essen, Munich, along the
Rhine, and in Westphalia. Allied bombers did not have to destroy
all of them, however, to achieve success—wrecking other factories closer to the front might produce greater results. “In this
war there is, among the factories, as far as the front, a mechanism like a perfect watch-making workshop,” Salveneschi wrote.
“Enough to destroy a ‘specialized’ factory to obtain, in a short
time, enforced inaction of the enemy.”37 Because the Central Powers were likely to defend their key factories with fighter aircraft,
the attacking air fleet needed to be as large as possible and com18
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posed of sturdy aircraft (like the Tri-motor) so at least part of
the bombers could hit their target. The Italian acknowledged that
some bombs would miss their aim points and kill civilians, but
cautioned that “one must not permit sentimentality to interfere
with the destruction of factories. . . . [T]he life of every German
labourer at work for the war has less value than one of our boys
who is fighting for his country.”38 Yet Salveneschi did not advocate killing civilians to defeat the enemy. Rather, he moved past
that question to assert, somewhat antiseptically, that Caproni’s
dream of an aerial victory could “be converted into [the] reality
of figures and formulae.”39
Salveneschi’s writings meshed neatly with those of rnas Major
Lord Tiverton, whom Gorrell met in France during the autumn of
1917. While serving as technical liaison officer for the Royal Navy’s Air Department in Paris, Tiverton completed his own thorough study of long-range bombing in early September, and his
analysis compared favorably to that provided by Salveneschi and
Caproni.40 Gorrell found Tiverton’s views particularly compelling—so much so that he used Tiverton’s paper, virtually verbatim, for the body of his own plan that he finished in late November.41 Although Gorrell’s plan took into account Grey’s expertise
and Caproni’s images, as well as Mitchell’s ideas, gleaned largely
from Trenchard, about air power’s ability to destroy the German
army’s means to fight, Tiverton’s notions had a telling impact on
Gorrell’s thoughts. Gorrell added an introduction and conclusion
to address strictly American concerns, but most of the remaining
words came from Tiverton.42
Gorrell began by noting that three and a half years of conflict
had produced a stalemate on the ground and at sea, and that only
“a new policy of attacking the enemy” would affect the war’s conduct.43 That new policy was “strategical bombing,” which he defined as air attacks on commercial centers and lines of commu19
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nication to stop the flow of enemy supplies to the front. Much
like Salveneschi, Gorrell asserted that “there are a few certain indispensable targets without which Germany cannot carry on the
war.”44 The German army could be likened to a drill, whose point
could continue to bore only if the shank—the German national effort—remained durable. Four target groups were essential to keeping the shank strong: the industries surrounding Dusseldorf, Cologne, Mannheim, and the Saar. If those vital factories and their
transportation links were destroyed, the drill would become impotent. “German shells are being fired at Allied troops and positions over a large area of the Front,” he observed, “but the manufacture of these shells and bombs is dependent upon the output of
a few specific, well-known factories turning out the chemicals for
them. . . . If the chemical factories can be blown up, the shell and
bomb output will cease, to a greater or lesser degree, dependent
upon the damage done these chemical plants.”45 In addition, Germany’s main aircraft engine factory and magneto plant were both
in Stuttgart, and their destruction would severely hamper Germany’s ability to sustain its air power on the Western Front.
The belief that the essence of an enemy nation’s war-making
capability consisted of certain key components linking together
its industrial complex was the crux of Gorrell’s proposal—and a
conviction that ultimately became a central pillar of the American approach to strategic bombing.
Although destroying German war-making capability was the
focus of Gorrell’s plan, his scheme presupposed that attacks on industrial targets would also break the morale of the German work
force. His rationale stemmed partly from the effects of German
air raids on the French factory at Pont-St. Vincent, where workers had been reluctant to return to their duties even though the
bombs had missed the mark; he knew as well of the work stoppages resulting from the Gotha offensive against London.46 Gor20
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rell believed that a concentrated air attack against the four enemy
target groups would persuade the German populace to demand
an end to the conflict, and called for one hundred bomber squadrons to start the campaign by simultaneously attacking armament works in Mannheim and Ludwigshafen for five continuous hours. “If immediately afterwards, on the next possible day,
Frankfurt were attacked in a similar way, judging from the press
reports of what has already occurred in Germany,” he contended,
“it is quite possible that Cologne would create such trouble that
the German government might be forced to suggest terms if that
town were so attacked.”47
To Gorrell, a nation’s will to fight equated to the population’s
willingness to endure the conflict. A mass revolution that threatened to dislodge the enemy government—and forced its government to make peace to stay in power—would certainly indicate
that bombs had broken enemy morale. Yet a popular revolt was
not necessary to break German will. For Gorrell, widespread absenteeism would suffice, and would have the same impact as factories destroyed by bombs. The ultimate goal was to prevent the
German army from waging war.
The enemy’s capability and will to fight were complementary
objectives, and Gorrell’s offensive aimed at both. “From both the
morale point of view and also that of material damage, concentration of our aerial forces against single targets on the same day is
of vital importance since it tends to hamper the defense and also
to complete in a thorough manner the work which the bombardment is intended to perform,” he observed.48
Gorrell estimated that between three thousand and six thousand
American bombers were necessary to carry out his plan, provided
that the force received adequate logistical support and aircrew
training.49 The armada would fly en masse, and concentrate on destroying a particular set of targets completely before assaulting a
21
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different target group. Hearkening to Trenchard, Gorrell stressed
continuous, systematic bombing as the key to overwhelming German defenses while unnerving workers and preventing them from
making repairs. Yet the Germans, Gorrell warned, also realized
the potential of strategic bombing and aimed to launch a similar large-scale effort against the Allies during the next year. Thus,
the sooner the American campaign began, the better. “This is not
a phantom nor a dream,” he wrote to Bolling in October 1917,
“but is a huge reality capable of being carried out with success if
the United States will only carry on a sufficiently large campaign
for next year, and manufacture the types of airplanes that lend
themselves to this campaign, instead of building pursuit planes
already out of date here in Europe.”50
Gorrell submitted his plan on 28 November to Brigadier General Benjamin Foulois, who had become Chief of the aef Air Service the previous day. The two had served together as pilots in the
First Aero Squadron during the Mexican punitive expedition and
knew each other well. Like Mitchell, Foulois had changed his attitude on the value of independent air operations since his 1913
testimony that Army aviation belonged under Signal Corps’ control. He approved Gorrell’s plan in December and sent it to General Pershing for his endorsement. Foulois also placed Gorrell—
now a lieutenant colonel—in charge of Strategical Aviation in the
Zone of the Advance. Persuaded that an independent bombing
force would not deprive him of air support for American ground
troops, Pershing approved the plan in early January. Gorrell then
transferred to Pershing’s staff as the Air Service’s g-3 (War Plans
and Operations) representative to oversee the plan’s implementation, but he remained attuned to Pershing’s concern that the Air
Service might neglect American armies.
To assuage this fear, Gorrell produced a written analysis of his
plan’s impact on Army aviation for Pershing’s staff. Entitled “The
Future Role of American Bombardment Aviation,” the study bor22
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rowed heavily from a report that Trenchard had presented to the
British War Cabinet in December 1917, as well as from a recent
French bombing plan that American staff officers had translated
into English.51 Yet Gorrell made certain that his paper addressed
the Army’s anxiety over air support while emphasizing the great
benefits of strategic bombing. He pointedly observed in the first
paragraph: “The Air Service is an integral part of a homogeneous
team, no portion of which, working by itself, can alone decisively
defeat the enemy.”52 Gorrell then noted that air power would continue to support ground combat operations by serving as a “long
range gun” that could attack the enemy’s rear echelons beyond the
range of fixed artillery, as well as by attacking the enemy’s frontline positions when necessary. Raids would also occur against
important road and rail junctions near the front, which would
prevent the flow of vital supplies and cause the enemy “grave results.” Attacks against enemy industries would pay dividends at
the front as well. “To successfully strike at such works, is to injure the source of the current which furnished the combative energy of the enemy,” he maintained.53
Besides devoting a large amount of attention to “tactical” air
power, Gorrell provided ample insights on “strategical bombing,”
many of them courtesy of Hugh Trenchard. Gorrell stated that
such bombing occurred mainly at long distances and was integral
to the air offensive on the Western Front. It was not primarily a
vehicle for retaliation. Instead, its basic purpose was “to weaken
the power of the enemy both directly and indirectly; directly, by
interrupting his production, transport, and organization through
the infliction of damage on his industrial, railway, and military centers and by compelling him to draw back his [aerial] fighting machines to deal with the enemy’s; indirectly, by producing discontent and alarm among the industrial population. In other words,
it aims at achieving both a material and a moral effect.”54
Gorrell reiterated that German war production depended on a
23
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few key links in its industrial complex and that destroying them
would grind the German war effort to a halt. Pinpointing those
links was the essence of successful bombing. Thus far, the lack of
“proper scientific knowledge” and the failure to identify “the real
object” of an air offensive had prevented bombing from achieving its potential.55 Gorrell claimed that the necessary expertise
now existed, and he was determined to use it. Aircraft would attack the industrial centers earmarked in his plan, and the bombs
that missed would have “the desired moral effect” by depriving
the enemy of “the enormous number of man-hours that a single
aerial bombardment of necessity always causes.”56 Attacks would
occur throughout daylight and darkness, with day bombers flying
at high altitude in tight formation to overcome enemy defenses,
while night bombers flew with the impunity that he believed allowed them to conduct the most accurate bombing.
Implementation Problems

As Gorrell worked to sell his scheme at aef headquarters, Lieutenant Colonel Ambrose Monell took over in late January as Chief of
Strategical Aviation in the Zone of the Advance. An ex-president
of the International Nickel Company, Monell was assisted in his
new endeavor by Gorrell’s former compatriots Fowler and Grey.
Meanwhile, Gorrell helped create an Office of Air Intelligence in
the g-2 (Intelligence) Section of the aef staff. This section contained a “bomb target unit,” described by historian Thomas Greer
as the “prototype of the organizations which played such an important role in the strategic operations of World War II.”57 The
unit produced target maps, antiaircraft defense maps, and maps
of key German railroads and industries, all divided into “target
folders” for specific installations.
While the Americans geared up to bomb Germany, the British
had already launched the assault. In October 1917, in response to
24
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the Gotha raids, Prime Minister David Lloyd George had promised
London’s citizens: “We will give it all back to them and we will give
it to them soon. We shall bomb Germany with compound interest.”58 Limited attacks began before the end of the year, and many
of them were indiscriminate. Trenchard announced at a meeting
with Gorrell and French representatives on 22 December that he
aimed to establish a special force for bombing German industry
and asked whether the French and Americans would contribute
to it. Gorrell stated that the Americans planned to begin a similar effort but that he could not pledge the Air Service to a joint
endeavor without Pershing’s approval.59 In contrast to the eagerness for bombing Germany that they had displayed to the Bolling mission, the French were lukewarm now that the idea had become a reality. They stressed Germany’s ease of retaliation against
French cities, and indeed in January 1918 German bombers attacked Paris for the first time in two and a half years.60 The British then confined their raids to factories and rail yards, but they
did not curb their plans for a separate bombing unit. On 5 June
1918, Trenchard took command of the Independent Air Force
(iaf) of the newly created Royal Air Force. The need to devote
half his sorties against German airfields, and the small number
of aircraft available (his force varied between five and ten squadrons), limited the amount of iaf bombs dropped on Germany to
550 tons, which were spread over fifty towns and cities.61 Nonetheless, Trenchard claimed that the “moral effect” of his bombing outweighed its material impact by twenty to one.62
Because Trenchard took orders only from the British Air Ministry, the iaf effort endeared itself to neither the French nor the
Americans. The French were particularly incensed, as their Marshal Ferdinand Foch was Supreme Allied Commander. Trenchard’s
restricted chain-of-command also led the aef Chief of Staff, Major General James W. McAndrew, to prohibit American bombing
25
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with the iaf once Air Service bombardment units reached sufficient strength to conduct separate operations. In January 1918
Pershing had agreed that British personnel could organize, train,
and equip the thirty projected American night bombing squadrons, and British flying schools also taught some American day
bombing aircrews. In all, thirty-six Americans attached to the iaf
flew combat “training” missions over Germany, and half of them
were killed, wounded, or captured.63 Yet just as Pershing prohibited American ground combat units from amalgamating with Allied armies, he would not condone American bombers flying to
achieve British objectives, especially when American ground forces
needed air support. “In making arrangements with the British it
must be thoroughly understood that when our [air] forces reach
a certain importance the regions to be bombed will be designated
by these headquarters and that the selection of targets will depend solely upon their importance with respect to the operations
which we contemplate for our ground forces,” McAndrew told
Major General Mason Patrick, who had replaced Foulois as aef
Air Service chief.64 The issue of cooperative allied air operations
was a sticky one, however, and Americans would revisit it with
the British in the years to come.
In the end, America’s bombing contribution to the Great War
consisted of day bombers raiding targets in France, and that contribution was meager. Eight antiquated Breguet-14 b-2 biplanes of
the Ninety-sixth Aero Squadron flew in the first American bombing raid, a 12 June 1918 attack on the rail yard and warehouses
in Dommary-Baroncourt. Two planes returned to base with engine problems, while three others ran out of gas after dropping
their bombs. Because of the Breguets’ feeble engines, it took several minutes for the tiny formation to climb to its bombing altitude of four thousand feet. Still, some of the aircraft hit the target, and they survived attacks by three enemy fighters on the way
26
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home. This first attack typified those occurring for the remainder
of the war. In August the Ninety-sixth flew twenty missions and
dropped forty-three thousand pounds of bombs against transportation and supply targets; in September and October it teamed
with the Eleventh and Twentieth Aero Squadrons to support the
American ground offensives at St. Mihiel and the Argonne.65
Colonel Billy Mitchell, who directed almost 1,500 allied aircraft at St. Mihiel as Chief of Air Service, First Army, now stressed
air power’s auxiliary mission rather than its independent one. In
February 1918, as Chief of Air Service, First Corps, he had argued that the first mission of offensive air power must be the destruction of the enemy’s air force. Thereafter, bombing operations
“should be essentially tactical in their nature and directed against
active enemy units in the field which will have a direct bearing on
operations during this Spring and Summer, rather than a piecemeal attack against large factory sites and things of that nature.
The factories, if completely destroyed, would undoubtedly have a
very far-reaching effect, but to completely demolish them is a tremendously difficult thing, and, furthermore, even if they were ruined, their effect would not be felt for a long period of time (possibly a year) upon the fighting of their army.”66
Although after the war Mitchell berated Pershing’s staff for
“trying to handle aviation as an auxiliary of some of the other
branches, instead of an independent fighting arm,”67 such criticisms
during the conflict were infrequent. All his duties after leaving the
Chateau de Chamarandes—Air Service Commander in the Zone
of the Advance; Chief of Air Service, First Army; Chief of Air Service, First Corps; Chief of Air Service, First Brigade; once again
Chief of Air Service, First Army; and finally, Chief of Air Service,
Army Group—directly supported American troops at the front.
As a result, his focus changed. “The Air Service of an army is one
of its offensive arms,” he stated after taking command in the Zone
27
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of the Advance. “Alone it cannot bring about a decision. It therefore helps the other arms in their appointed missions.”68
Late in the war, knowing that the Germans could not stop the
continued American ground advance, Mitchell’s focus returned
to the possibilities of strategic bombing. Yet as long as the Army’s
progress remained uncertain, he devoted his full energies to providing it with immediate air support. Of course, Mitchell’s ego
had much to do with his pragmatic approach to air power—he
craved a combat command, and the only combat air commands
available were those attached to Army headquarters. Still, by the
summer of 1918, he realized that America’s major contribution to
the Allied advance would be made by aef ground echelons, and
that air support would enhance their impact.
McAndrew and Pershing agreed with Mitchell’s emphasis on
supporting the ground battle. Besides limiting air operations with
the British, in mid-June Pershing’s chief of staff had admonished
Patrick that his officers who stressed an “independent” air campaign must realize that their views were contrary to the needs of
the service. “It is therefore directed that these officers be warned
against any idea of independence and that they be taught from
the beginning that their efforts must be closely coordinated with
those of the remainder of the Air Service and those of the ground
army,” McAndrew stated.69 Recent savage fighting by the American Second and Third Divisions at Chateau-Thierry had helped
stop the German drive on Paris, and further bloodshed was imminent as Pershing readied his troops to support Foch’s counteroffensive. When the assault began, the American commander
wanted his soldiers to have maximum backing from their Air Service. The June name-change of the Strategical Aviation branch to
the General Headquarters (ghq) Air Service Reserve reflected this
continuing concern.
By the summer of 1918 Gorrell’s scheme for a massive Amer28
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ican air offensive had atrophied. Colonel Monell had, in Gorrell’s words, worked on developing a strategic air force for only
“a month or so,”70 and Major Fowler left Air Service headquarters to command the American air units operating with the British. Discouraged by production deficiencies and convinced that
an American strategic bombing campaign would never materialize, Wing Commander Grey returned to a British assignment. Monell succeeded during his tenure as Chief of the Strategical Section/ghq Reserve only in selecting prospective airfields for his
phantom force.71
After the war, Gorrell wrote that a major reason American strategic bombing never materialized was that his plans “were not synchronized properly, especially from a mental point of view” with
the Army’s General Headquarters.72 General Foulois concurred,
declaring in October 1919: “The General Staff of the Army, either
through lack of vision, lack of practical knowledge, or deliberate intention to subordinate the Air Service needs to the needs of
other combat arms, has utterly failed to appreciate the full military
value of this new military weapon, and, in my opinion, has failed
to accord it its just place in our military family.”73 Even Mitchell,
who had worked tirelessly to support the ground forces with air
power, agreed that Army officers—with the sole exception of Major General Hunter Liggett, who had commanded the First Army—
did not know what “air power” meant.74 In July 1918, Mitchell
had insisted that the Chief of the Air Service, rather than the Army’s General Staff, should direct the Air Service’s ghq Reserve.
He based his argument on the need for unity of command, which
would allow the Air Service chief to concentrate all available air
power in a critical area for maximum impact.75 His plea went unheeded, even though the ghq Reserve existed in name only—an
American squadron of night bombers did not arrive at the front
until 9 November 1918.
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In his memoirs, Pershing articulated his views regarding the
subordination of air power to ground combat. He remarked in
his discussion of the Argonne offensive: “The tendency of our
air force at first was to attach too much significance to flights beyond the enemy’s lines in an endeavor to interrupt his communications. However, this was of secondary importance during the
battle, as aviators were then expected to protect and assist our
ground troops.”76 To him, the main functions of an air force were
to drive off hostile aircraft and provide the infantry and artillery
with information on enemy troop movements. Many Army officers agreed. One week before the Armistice, a General Staff analysis noted that the meager number of American bombers at the
front (the Air Service had six squadrons of day bombers at the
end of the war) and the small number of bombs they carried made
their destructive potential “practically the same as long-range artillery.” Ignoring the issue of range, the study’s authors concluded
that it took “two squadrons of bombing planes to equal the work
of one 155mm. gun.”77
In the final analysis, the key reason that the United States never
mounted a bomber offensive was indeed the failure to build bombers for it. “Aircraft production [was] the greatest American air
headache of World War I,” recalled Hap Arnold, who tracked the
building of warplanes as a thirty-year-old colonel and assistant
to the director of the Signal Corps’ Aeronautical Division.78 Arnold bemoaned the inefficient organization that divided responsibility for developing aircraft between the civilian Bureau of Aircraft Production and the Signal Corps’ Production Division. The
Bureau, led by the former chief of Hudson Automobiles, Howard Coffin, supervised engineering, supply, and testing, while the
Production Division oversaw procurement. Neither organization
had an aviator assigned to it on a full-time basis. Arnold remembered that after Coffin boasted forty thousand aircraft would be
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built by June 1918, he asked the industrialist how many spare
parts he had ordered. “What do you need spare parts for?” was
Coffin’s reply.79 Competing guidance from Americans in Europe
matched the overlapping authority of production agencies in the
United States. After the Bolling mission recommended building
the Caproni bomber, General Pershing claimed final authority to
determine aircraft types, and in November 1917 he recommended
production of the British two-engine Handley-Page.80 Incredibly,
despite the difficulties that would stem from building two types
of bombers, the Joint Army-Navy Technical Board suggested producing both—and the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the
Navy approved the recommendation!81
European designs compounded American production problems.
Most of the materials provided by the French, British, and Italian
builders to serve as guidelines for Coffin’s manufacturers were incomplete or delayed. American production centered on the machine
tools and detailed blueprints of the assembly line, whereas European production stressed skilled craftsmen and individual workmanship.82 Not until 16 January 1918—almost six months after
the Bolling mission’s initial selection—did Caproni’s representatives arrive in the United States. British designers for the Handley-Page had arrived only two weeks earlier.83 The combination
of differing production philosophies, delayed arrivals, and overlapping authority produced construction programs with wildly
fluctuating numbers of projected aircraft. The planned number
of Caproni bombers went from 500 on 9 August 1917 to 9,000
a week later, to 2,000 on 24 August, to 50 on 19 February 1918,
and to 250 on 3 May.84 In actuality, the United States built only
one Caproni before the Armistice. As for the Handley-Page, plans
to assemble 300 bombers in Britain resulted in only the shipment
of parts for 101 before the war’s end, and none were assembled
in time to fight.85 General Patrick’s July 1918 proposal of an Air
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Service of 202 total squadrons, of which 41 would be bombers,
compared to his proposal six weeks earlier for 261 squadrons,
of which 101 would be bombers, reflected no loss of faith in the
bomber’s ability to change the war. Rather, it displayed a realistic
appraisal of America’s dismal production capability.86
That the war ended before American bombers had the chance to
bomb German soil proved significant. Production deficiencies had
prevented Gorrell’s dream of defeating Germany through strategic
bombing from becoming a reality, yet the dream endured. Gorrell,
Mitchell, and other Air Service officers could speculate about the
probable effect that an American bomber offensive might have
had on the outcome of the war, and blame the lack of aircraft as
a reason why the offensive never materialized. Such difficulties
could be overcome. Now air officers were aware of Gorrell’s postwar admonition that “money and men could not make an air program over night,”87 and they would make amends.
Had the war continued into 1919, Mitchell, certain that the German Army could not stop the American ground advance, planned
an aerial assault against Germany’s interior. “I was sure that if
the war lasted, air power would decide it,” he wrote after the Armistice.88 According to his diary, he intended to combine incendiary attacks with poison gas to destroy crops, forests, and livestock. This air offensive, he mused, “would have caused untold
sufferings and forced a German surrender.”89 Yet the likelihood
of Mitchell’s vision becoming reality was remote. President Wilson told Congress in his war message: “We shall, I feel confident,
conduct our operations as belligerents without passion and ourselves observe with proud punctilio the principles of right and fair
play we profess to be fighting for.”90 Secretary of War Baker reflected those sentiments, telling Army Chief of Staff General Peyton March to notify the Air Service that the United States would
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not conduct any bombing that “has as its objective, promiscuous bombing upon industry, commerce, or population, in enemy
countries disassociated from obvious military needs to be served
by such action.”91 Moreover, in early January 1919, Mitchell revealed that his notion of strategic bombing had come to resemble Gorrell’s. In a treatise entitled “Tactical Application of Military Aeronautics,” he argued that the main value of bombardment
would come from “hitting an enemy’s great nerve centers at the
very beginning of the war so as to paralyze them to the greatest
extent possible.”92
Gorrell’s plan, which initially had won Pershing’s approval,
borrowed heavily from Caproni and Tiverton in stressing attacks
against key industrial centers rather than the German populace
and its livelihood. By destroying those elements of Germany’s industrial complex that were essential components of the army’s
means to fight, Gorrell aimed to render enemy forces impotent.
For him, the key to applying air power successfully was identifying those industries that made the German army tick and then
wrecking them through accurate bombing. Such bombing would
also terrify the German work force and keep it away from the target factories. “Precision” bombing had proved far from precise,
though.93 Night raids were notoriously inaccurate, despite Gorrell’s
belief that accuracy increased because of immunity from enemy
defenses. American day raids, which relied on formation bombing aided by a primitive bombsight in the lead aircraft,94 also offered less than pinpoint accuracy. Still, the problem of bombing
precisely appeared to be a mechanical one that could be solved
through improved equipment, much like production problems
could be eliminated through efficient organization.
For both Mitchell and Gorrell, scientifically applied air power offered the prospect of ending a war without the horrendous slaugh33
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ter of trench warfare. If bombing achieved that objective, the Army’s air units might merit status as an independent service—and
armies would perhaps become obsolete.
In the aftermath of the Great War, the clamor for air independence would become a roar, with Mitchell howling loudest of all.
The Air Service had achieved an enduring measure of autonomy
at the end of May 1918, when the Overman Act removed it from
Signal Corps’ control and created a “Director of Military Aeronautics” directly under the Army’s Chief of Staff. Three months
later Congress named Jack D. Ryan, who had succeeded Howard
Coffin as chief of Aircraft Production, as Second Assistant Secretary of War and Director of Air Service. Yet for Mitchell these steps
were not enough. As his cry became increasingly shrill, it welded
the bond between air power’s independent application and service autonomy until the link was impossible to break.
In October 1918, the twenty-seven-year-old Gorrell became the
youngest American colonel since the Civil War. He served as Assistant Chief of the Air Service until the Armistice, and then began
writing the Air Service’s combat history. In March 1920 he left
the military to try his hand as a corporate executive, ultimately
becoming director and president of the Stutz Motor Car Company and president of the American Air Transport Association.
In the meantime, his plan for bombing Germany, and his 1918
analysis of it, inspired lectures for a future generation of air strategists at Maxwell Field’s Air Corps Tactical School. Three days
after he died in March 1945, a single Army Air Forces airplane
scattered Gorrell’s ashes across the plain at West Point, where he
had sprinted almost thirty-five years before to catch a glimpse of
Glenn Curtiss’s flying machine. The tribute befitted the man who
laid the cornerstone for vast air campaigns then underway in Europe and the Pacific.
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